Fresh from graduating from a Master’s in Sustainable Development Management, diaspora youth intern alumna Nicha Phannajit shares insights from her research exploring the environment for diaspora organisations in Europe. Her thesis, “The effects of the rise of the far right in Europe on diaspora-led development activities,” looks into how shifting political climates in Europe are reshaping the landscape for diaspora organisations and how these actors continue to adapt, resist, and contribute to development despite growing constraints.

In conversation with EUDiF Communications Officer Nalé Barbieri Pederiva, Nicha shares key findings from her research, focusing on the cases of Germany and the Netherlands. She highlights the resilience, solidarity, and long-term commitment that continue to define diaspora-led development efforts.

Nalé: In your thesis you analyse the effects of the rise of far-right parties in Germany and the Netherlands on diaspora-led development activities. In what ways is this changing political climate affecting the work of those diaspora organisations working in the sector? Is it the same across all organisations?

Nicha: As actors navigating complex transnational spaces, the development works of diaspora organisations are shaped by varied sets of factors, including political climates in their countries of residence. While favourable migration and development policies, together with positive public support, enable diaspora’s active participation in development activities, the rise of the far right increasingly undermines these conditions.

Two broad patterns emerged from the research:

• Restrictive shifts in migration and development policies, including more stringent migration measures, funding cuts, reduced capacity-building support, and increasingly conditional development cooperation. These changes have constrained organisational capacities and pushed many diaspora organisations to adapt their operations to maintain organisational continuity and keep development activities running.
• Heightened public hostility and racialised discrimination, which have made it more difficult for diaspora organisations to gain public support and have, in some cases, exposed them to threats and exclusion.

These effects are not identical across all organisations; they vary depending on organisational leadership, attributes, and the context in which each organisation operates.

Nalé: I understand then that not all organisations were impacted the same way. Does that have to do with differences between the two cases? What was similar and different between the case of Germany and the Netherlands?

Nicha: Exactly. The influence of far-right politics differs across national contexts. Hence, I adopted a cross-country comparative research approach to capture such nuances. The case of Germany and the Netherlands between 2010 and early 2025 were a good comparative scenario. Both countries shared broader political constituencies, yet their trajectories diverged in terms of the intensity of far-right influence and the changing nature of their diaspora engagement approaches.

In Germany, the far-right impacts were largely discursive, yet without direct policy effects. At the same time, Germany’s traditionally-centralized diaspora engagement approach began to incorporate more diaspora-led priorities.

In the Netherlands, by contrast, the far-right factions successfully mainstreamed their rhetoric and shaped the Dutch migration and development policy agenda, creating more restrictive conditions in both migration and development domains. These shifts directly tightened space for diaspora engagement.

These contextual differences were reflected in the findings:

• The Dutch-based diaspora organisations faced tangible policy constraints, including shifts in development priorities and reduced structural support.
• No equivalent policy impact was observed in Germany; diaspora organisations instead navigated pre-existing structural challenges not clearly attributable to far-right influence.
• In both contexts, respondents reported experiences or observations of racialised discrimination, which in some cases contributed to reduced public support, internal tensions within diaspora communities, or exposure to discriminatory behaviours.

Yet, these findings are a broad comparison. The extent to which these challenges affected diaspora-led development activities depends not only on differing national contexts, but also on individual organisations’ thematic focuses, operating sites, as well as differences in capacities to absorb and adapt to political changes.

Nalé: Faced with these challenges, how did the diaspora organisations react and respond? Were there any particularities in the approach from the organisations in each of the countries?

Nicha: Like the impacts, the responses were diverse, not only across countries but also across individual organisations as they obtained different attributes, worked on different thematic areas, or operated in different sites. Yet, several common responses emerged:

• Coalition-building: across both cases, we could see diaspora organisations forming alliances to establish pools of resources, foster long-term resilience, or mobilize against discrimination.
• Risk mitigation: there were also occasions when diaspora organisations avoided direct confrontation to mitigate risks of activity disruption.
• Organisational adjustment: this was particularly adopted among the Dutch-based diaspora organisations, which adjusted project implementations (e.g. downsizing activities or shifting core operating sites), and internal management (e.g. diversifying funding sources or moving toward voluntary-based work) to cope with declining structural support.

Although these results do not represent every organisation based in Germany and the Netherlands, they collectively highlight the resilience, solidarity, and commitment of the diaspora. Even under increasingly restrictive conditions, many organisations continued to contribute to development by drawing on strategic leadership, solidarity among their networks and communities, and alternative resource channels.

These attributes fundamentally shaped their ability not only to survive, but to continue contributing meaningfully to development.

Nalé: Based on the results of your research, you propose some recommendations. What can diaspora organisations do to build resilience to better face challenges like this in the future?

Nicha: Drawing on the experiences and suggestions shared by respondents, there are four key action points diaspora organisations can take and tailor to their capacities, experiences, and long-term aspirations:

1. Strengthening diaspora members’ leadership and strategic competencies, including conflict negotiation and stakeholder engagement skills, which are essential for navigating periods of political uncertainty.
2. Building strategic network and cross-community partnerships to strengthen collective action and establish alternative sources of support.
3. Exploring innovative and sustainable funding models, moving beyond traditional membership fees or fundraising to include such innovative solutions as blockchain and crowdfunding technologies.
4. Investing in community empowerment and political participation, reinforcing individual diaspora members’ power to influence transformative changes.

These far-right challenges persist and continuously evolve well beyond the period covered in this study; therefore, I therefore hope that these findings and recommendations, grounded in the lived experience of diaspora organisations and expert insights, can support our development communities in navigating and strengthening resilience during this period of uncertainty.

Finally, it is important that governments, donors, and other stakeholders recognise these strengths and contributions of diaspora actors, and continue working to realise an enabling environment for diaspora-led development.